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Symposium Article 
War Aims Matter: Keeping Jus Contra Bellum 
Restrictive While Requiring the Articulation of 
the Goals of the Use of Force 
Jens Iverson 
Abstract 
Should planned humanitarian interventions be required to 
have a well-articulated plan for peace?  What has been lost by 
reducing the principal justification for the use of force to self-
defense?  This article explains why a full articulation of the goals 
of the use of force should be required, but why this explanation of 
desired ends should not entail a loosening of the limited legal 
justifications for the use of force.  Jus post bellum is focused on 
the successful transition from armed conflict to peace.  The 
success of this effort begins with the formation and declaration of 
war aims, not with steps taken after cessation of hostilities. A 
review of recent international armed conflicts in Kuwait, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, and elsewhere, underscores 
the connection between the articulation of war aims and the 
quality of the resulting peace.  The customary law on declarations 
of war and peacemaking are examined, as well as current law 
rooted in the United Nations Charter. 
The articulation of war aims matters not only for jus post 
bellum, but for the prevention of war and for jus in bello as well.  
 
  Assistant Professor of Law, Ph.D., J.D., Grotius Centre for 
International Legal Studies, Law Faculty, Leiden University. This work is 
presented as a preliminary version of the keynote address that was given at the 
November 2017 Symposium, Jus Post Bellum: Justice After the War, at the 
University of Minnesota Law School which focused on transitional justice. 
Feedback from the esteemed faculty of the Grotius Centre for International 
Legal Studies has proven invaluable, including feedback from Carsten Stahn, 
Larissa van den Herik, Eric de Brabandere, Joe Powderly, Niels Blokker, Kees 
Waaldijk, Catherine Harwood, Gelijn Molier, Cale Davis, and Giulia Pinzauti. 
Thanks also to Katherine Orlovsky and to the Editors and Staff at the 
Minnesota Journal of International Law for their kind assistance and patience. 
All errors are the responsibility of the author. 
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An honest discussion of what is required to create the desired 
situation post bellum can generate internal and allied pressure 
to avoid the use of force in the first place. A clear explanation of 
the aims of the use of force may also improve rules of engagement 
so that specific targeting decisions and other decisions prioritize 
the construction of a just and sustainable peace. A more 
forthright and comprehensive formulation and disclosure of war 
aims should be demanded from the outset and throughout any 
ongoing series of decisions to use force. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THE BRIDGE 
Imagine targeting a bridge. Destroying the bridge provides 
a military advantage, and it can be done in a manner that no one 
is likely to be hurt or killed, but destroying the bridge may make 
the just and sustainable ending of the armed conflict more 
difficult.1 The bridge literally and historically connects two 
communities. Its destruction will cause enduring resentment. 
How do we make the decision whether to destroy the bridge? 
The jus in bello2 proportionality assessment is notoriously 
difficult to make—how exactly does one compare the apples of 
military necessity to the oranges of civilian lives and suffering? 
If destroying a bridge would be part of the first responsive act 
that would start armed conflict between a state or armed group, 
how should the jus ad bellum proportionality requirement be 
analyzed? Should the assessment of the value of the bridge be 
limited to its intrinsic value (e.g., price for replacement, cultural 
value, suffering caused by its destruction)? Or should there be a 
particular consideration of its role in maximizing the possibility 
of a successful transition to a just and sustainable peace? 
This article assesses broad themes and is based in part on a 
grand tradition, the just war tradition, that spans many 
 
 1. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case no. IT-04-74-T, Judgment (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013), http://www.icty.org/
case/prlic/4 (describing Mostar Bridge which arguably fits this model, but not 
implying any criminal liability attributable to specific instances). 
 2. During much of the twentieth century, the law applicable to armed 
conflict was typically divided into two parts, the first governing resort to force 
(jus ad bellum), and the second the conduct within the conflict (jus in bello). 
More recently, jus post bellum has often been included to make a tripartite 
analysis. 
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centuries and countless wars, but it is useful to begin with this 
limited hypothetical. There are numbers of specific criteria that 
can be applied to the firing of a single mortar—whether the order 
to fire violates international humanitarian law; whether the 
order to fire violates international criminal law; whether it is an 
act of aggression; whether such an order is so manifestly illegal 
it must be disobeyed; whether it follows the domestic law binding 
on the actors; whether it follows the terms of engagement; 
whether it is unethical; whether it is good policy; whether there 
is sufficient warning to civilians; whether it is properly timed; 
whether the method minimizes civilian harm; whether there are 
alternatives; whether the subsequent conduct minimizes civilian 
harm and maximizes war aims. But at the end of any 
assessment, the bridge will either remain standing or tumble 
into the gorge. Stacked against the concrete realities of the use 
of force, discussing the honesty surrounding war aims may seem 
trivial. But changing how war is discussed before the first 
mortar is fired may not only prevent the use of armed force 
sometimes, but also change how armed conflict is fought, and 
how peace is built. 
This work is as much about the public, forthright analysis 
(or lack thereof) that surrounds such a targeting decision as it is 
about the direct, classic analysis of the legality of the resulting 
destruction. Should the entity targeting the bridge be required 
to declare the rationale justifying the use of force? Most analyses 
of conduct such as this rightly focus on the conduct itself, not the 
public proclamations or justifications by those who decide 
whether and how to use force. Jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
analyses are generally objective evaluations of conduct. The 
existence of an armed conflict typically does not depend on the 
public statements of states.3 States may not declare war, or may 
actively deny the existence of an armed conflict, but nonetheless 
be in an armed conflict based on an objective analysis of relevant 
 
 3. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
III] (granting applicability of the Conventions even if a state of war is not 
recognized by a party to the armed conflict); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
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conduct. That said, this work will argue that in order to better 
restrain the general use of force, to wage armed conflict 
specifically, and more importantly, to improve any eventual 
transition from armed conflict to peace, a more forthright and 
comprehensive formulation and disclosure of war aims should be 
demanded from the outset and throughout any ongoing series of 
decisions to use force. 
B. INTRODUCING THE CONCEPTS 
How would one normally address the legal questions 
surrounding the potential use of armed force against a bridge as 
described above? The answer is not with the goals of the use of 
force, but with the legal justification for the use of force. 
Regardless of what is declared as the ultimate goal, an 
international or military lawyer is likely to ask first whether or 
not destroying the bridge is objectively justified by self-defense. 
In contemporary law, the legality of the use of armed force often 
comes down to, in one sense or another, whether it can be 
justified by self-defense, or in the alternative, whether the 
United Nations (“U.N.”) Security Council can authorize the 
action.4 This is most obvious in the interaction between Articles 
2.4 and 51 of the UN Charter5 in the case of the use of force by 
one state in response to an armed attack by another state, but it 
informs all discussions of the use of force. Perhaps the 
destruction of the bridge is an instance of collective self-defense, 
where many states may respond to an armed attack upon one 
state, but the core requirement of an attack on at least one state 
still remains. Or perhaps it is a use of force explicitly authorized 
by the U.N. Security Council—in which case the Council may be 
acting in essence on behalf of the sovereign state of Kuwait or 
the people of Libya,6 but the rationale is still at some level 
responsive, rooted in defense against aggression or atrocity. 
With respect to jus in bello assessments, the question of whether 
destroying a bridge is justified by military necessity is not as 
directly tied to self-defense as the jus ad bellum analysis. That 
said, the definition of what is included in a legitimate military 
 
 4. See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 5. See id. art. 2, ¶ 4, 51. 
 6. This is not intended to elide the substantial differences between defense 
of a sovereign state and an internal population, but here the commonality is 
emphasized to contrast this example with the previous variety of just causes for 
war. 
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aim is not unrelated to the question of jus ad bellum 
proportionality, so the overall question of self-defense may have 
repercussions with jus in bello analysis as well. If self-defense is 
always the final destination of the legal explanation, one might 
reasonably say that there is little to discuss beyond the assertion 
of the armed attack or resolution authorizing the use of force. If 
the only concern is legal authority and no further normative 
basis for the use of force or commitment to a successful eventual 
transition from an armed conflict is necessary, there may be 
little apparent reason to require any further formulation and 
disclosure of the goals of the use of force. 
This was not always the case. The goals of the use of force 
and the legal justification for the use of force were once diverse, 
largely the same, and in any case required articulation. As 
historians of international law have well understood,7 self-
defense was only one of many legitimate justifications for resort 
to the use of force before the revolution in jus ad bellum during 
the first half of the twentieth century (making it largely a body 
of law contra bellum, thus causing many to replace one Latin 
neoterism (jus ad bellum) with another (jus contra bellum)). 
Academia has recently highlighted this revolution, thanks to 
The Internationalists,8 and more broadly in a forthcoming work, 
War Manifestos.9 War Manifestos documents that the declared 
justifications for war included not only self-defense (still the 
most common justification), but also violation of treaty 
obligations, tortious wrongs, violations of the laws of war, 
protecting the balance of power, religious claims, protection of 
trade interests, humanitarian protection, protection of 
diplomatic relations, debt collection, and declarations of 
independence.10 Oona A. Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, co-
authors in both War Manifestos and The Internationalists, want 
to underline the historicity, contingency, and potential 
reversibility of the accomplishment of restricting the legal use of 
force to instances of self-defense, U.N. Security Council 
 
 7. See, e.g., FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 
128 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1975); David Luban, War as Punishment, 39 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 299, 299 (2011). 
 8. OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: 
HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD (2017). 
 9. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., War Manifestos, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (showcasing a remarkable effort to document the 
justification of war through the analysis of hundreds of years’ worth of war 
manifestos), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3037538. 
 10. See id. 
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authorization, or with permission of the territorial state. Their 
scholarship is a celebration of an underrated accomplishment, 
but more pointedly a warning against the squandering of the 
inheritance of a world order founded in large part on the 
prohibition of acquisition of territory by force and more generally 
on the restrictions on the use of force. 
Other scholars emphasize the same restriction of legitimate 
grounds for the use of force as a problem rather than an 
accomplishment. Gabriella Blum in Prizeless Wars emphasizes 
that a number of areas of jus ad bellum remain unclear, and 
places blame for this in part on the restriction on the ability of 
legal discourse to enunciate reasons for the use of force other 
than self-defense, without fully defining the scope and meaning 
of self-defense.11 Other scholars (mostly from the United States 
and United Kingdom, whose governments are also supportive of 
a changed interpretation) are also pushing back against jus 
contra bellum, particularly with respect to “humanitarian 
intervention” 12 or use of force under the “Responsibility to 
Protect” doctrine.13 
Can these views be bridged? Can we learn anything about 
the overall body of law and ethics that apply to matters of war 
and peace (including jus post bellum) from this new interest in 
stated war aims by Blum14 and from the remarkable research 
 
 11. Gabriella Blum, Prizeless Wars, Invisible Victories: The Modern Goals 
of Armed Conflict, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 633, 688 (2017). 
 12. See, e.g., U.K. GOV’T PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, CHEMICAL WEAPON USE 
BY SYRIAN REGIME: UK GOVERNMENT LEGAL POSITION (Aug. 29, 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-
regime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-
uk-government-legal-position-html-version; Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum 
and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 905 (2002); Jane E. 
Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 628 (2003); Jane E. Stromseth, New Paradigms for the Jus Ad Bellum? 38 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 561 (2006); Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a 
Moment – The Legal Basis in Favour of a Principle of Humanitarian 
Intervention, EJIL: TALK! (Sep. 12, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-
back-a-moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-
intervention/. 
 13. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 39-45 (2001). See also G.A. Res. 60/1, 
2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 138-39 (Sept.15, 2005); U.N. Secretary-
General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009); U.N. Secretary-General’s 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 65-7, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Nov. 29, 2004). 
 14. See Blum, supra note 11, at 688. 
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project described in War Manifestos, or is it best addressed only 
through jus contra bellum? 15 It is worth noting that the uses of 
force since the end of the Cold War that arguably or clearly 
violate jus contra bellum have not ended in a clear transition to 
a just and sustainable peace.16  If they did not begin well, they 
often did not end well. Whether one focuses on Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, Syria, or elsewhere, it is 
often hard to tie a clear expression of war aims to a clear 
accomplishment of those goals. Not only are the current 
restrictions on jus ad bellum effectively at risk of being 
disregarded—a view shared by all of the authors cited so far, 
albeit for different reasons—but in practical terms, there is little 
evidence that states are improving their ability to use force to 
accomplish clear and justifiable aims. 
By design, questions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are 
separated by a firm wall. The laws of armed conflict (jus in bello) 
may not be violated even if fighting a perfectly legal and justified 
war of self-defense. Similarly, no amount of respecting the laws 
of armed conflict will lessen the wrongfulness of a use of armed 
force in violation of the law articulated in U.N. Charter 2.4 
(judged pursuant to jus ad bellum).17 But this way of dividing 
our thinking of war and peace tends to miss connections that run 
through different areas of law pertaining to war and peace, what 
was once discussed as jure belli ac pacis.18 While the views of 
various authors are very unlikely to be reconciled, perhaps the 
path to drawing the best lessons from these conflicting views 
also requires bridging the various areas of just war theory 
separated during the twentieth century but subject to renewed 
interest in recent decades with special emphasis in the law of 
transition between armed conflict and a just and sustainable 
peace, which some call jus post bellum.19 
 
 15. See Hathaway et al., supra note 9. 
 16. See, e.g., Jens Iverson, Transitional Justice, Jus Post Bellum and 
International Criminal Law: Differentiating the Usages, History and Dynamics, 
7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 413 (2013). 
 17. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 
 18. HUGO GROTIUS, LIBRI TRES DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, IN QUIBUS IUS 
NATURAE ET GENTIUM, ITEM IURIS PUBLICI PRAECIPUA EXPLICANTUR (Francis W. 
Kelsey et al. trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1625) (Latin for the Laws of War 
and Peace). 
 19. Iverson, supra note 16. 
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C. ARGUMENT AND DEFINITIONS 
This work argues that an honest articulation of war aims 
matters. By “honest,” I mean a reasonable level of forthright and 
comprehensive public expression by the state considering the 
use of force. By “war aims,” I mean the actual intentions of those 
individuals and entities that choose whether or not to use force, 
regardless of whether that use of force would amount to armed 
conflict or state of war. By “matters,” I mean that whether or not 
something has legal, normative, and practical implications. 
In particular, this work makes the case that requiring the 
articulation of the goals of the use of force could aid in the 
successful transition from armed conflict to a just and 
sustainable peace when armed conflict does occur. By 
“improving the discussion,” I mean both the honest, internal 
debate within open societies where public support is likely to be 
necessary for the sustained commitment of resources if war aims 
extend beyond symbolic action and the public, forthright 
publication of the actual rationale for and goals of the use of 
force. By “successful transition from armed conflict to a just and 
sustainable peace,” I mean not merely the full cessation of 
hostilities, but rather the aim of a just peace unlikely to return 
to armed conflict over the same dispute, as has been the focus of 
the just war theory throughout its existence. 
As Larry May and Elizabeth Edenberg put it: 
It is not merely peace that is at issue, but a just peace, 
where mutual respect and the rule of law are key 
considerations . . . .The jus post bellum literature 
focuses, as one might expect, on the achieving of 
peace . . . .While jus post bellum theorists want a just 
peace, not merely any peaceful settlement of hostilities, 
they focus on the stopping of hostilities . . . .Jus post 
bellum principles all are aimed at securing a just and 
lasting peace at the end of war or armed conflict. 
Discussion of these principles has been standard fare in 
the Just War Tradition for several thousand years, even 
if jus post bellum principles are not usually given the 
status afforded to jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
principles.20 
 
 20. Larry May & Elizabeth Edenberg, Introduction, in JUS POST BELLUM 
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Recognition that the application of law in this area has, as 
May and Edenberg state, the aim of a just and lasting peace (and 
is not neutral with the application to these normative goals) is 
necessary for understanding and development of jus post 
bellum.21 Another way to frame the normative emphasis on a 
“just and sustainable peace” so often referenced in the literature 
of jus post bellum is to tie it to concepts from peace studies such 
as Johan Galtung’s “positive peace” being differentiated from a 
mere “negative” peace,22 without a just resolution of the causes 
of the war and conduct within the war. 
This work asserts that an honest discussion of war aims 
matters not only for jus post bellum, but for jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello as well. As described in War Manifestos,23 a clear 
statement of war aims has historically allowed the possibility of 
avoiding war due to settlement. In contemporary jus contra 
bellum, this should obviously function differently. Rather than 
threatening aggressive war, an honest discussion of what is 
required to create the desired end state may help generate 
internal and allied pressure to avoid the use of force in the first 
place. A clear explanation of the envisioned overall aims of the 
use of force may also improve rules of engagement so that 
specific targeting decisions and other decisions more firmly 
prioritize the eventual construction of a just and sustainable 
peace. 
D. ROADMAP 
This work will proceed as follows. The roots of the law on 
declarations of war and peacemaking will be examined in Part 
II, with a particular eye towards customary international law, 
as it existed before the twentieth century, focusing on the works 
 
AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1–3 (Larry May & Elizabeth Edenberg eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2013). 
 21. This section, as well as certain writing on Vattel and jus post bellum, 
builds in part upon unpublished work of the author. 
 22. The concepts of “positive” peace were developed by Johan Galtung in 
his seminal 1964 article: Johan Galtung, An Editorial, 1 J. PEACE RES. 1 (1964). 
For more on Galtung’s work on structural analysis of peace, see also Johan 
Galtung, Cultural Violence, 27 J. PEACE RES. 291 (1990); Johan Galtung, Social 
Cosmology and the Concept of Peace, 18 J. PEACE RES. 183 (1981); Johan 
Galtung, Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some 
Responses, 22 J. PEACE RES. 141 (1985); Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace and 
Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167 (1969);  
 23. Hathaway et al., supra note 9. 
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of Emer de Vattel. Part III will provide further context for the 
current tripartite structure (jus ad/contra bellum, jus in bello, 
and jus post bellum) commonly used to evaluate the laws and 
norms pertaining to the use of force, conduct within armed 
conflict, and the transition from armed conflict to peace. After 
this initial grounding in the past and present norms regarding 
war aims and the transition to peace, the current discussion 
regarding the restrictive nature of jus contra bellum and how 
that relates to war aims is re-introduced in Part IV. Part V 
extends this discussion to examine how a public and forthright 
declaration of the aims of the use of force may be connected to 
the successful transition to a just and sustainable peace in six 
recent conflicts, namely Kuwait, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Libya, and Ukraine. In the conclusion, a discussion of the 
uncertain future of the laws of war and peace is provided. 
II. DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND PEACEMAKING 
BEFORE JUS CONTRA BELLUM 
The idea that war aims should be stated is ancient.24 The 
earliest relevant example is the Roman practice limiting warfare 
of demanding redress formally through a repetio rerum.25 This 
diplomatic document would list the wrongs allegedly done and 
the conduct needed to satisfy Rome.26 After thirty-three days, if 
satisfaction had not been obtained, the next step was legal 
authorization in the name of the Senate and the people of 
Rome.27 Only then would the fetial priests issue a formal 
declaration of war, and military measures could commence.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 24. This section builds upon the author’s Ph.D. thesis The Function of Jus 
Post Bellum in International Law. This study focuses on legal and normative 
principles of the transition from armed conflict to peace, often called jus post 
bellum. It does not focus on declarations of war, but does address the deep roots 
of jus post bellum, including Emer de Vattel’s writings. 
 25. JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF 
WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY 153–54 (Princeton Univ. Press 1981). 
 26. Id. at 154. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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Emer de Vattel’s29 Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi 
Naturelle, appliqués à la Conduite et aux Affaires des Nations et 
des Souverains30 is a classic of international law. Emmanuelle 
Jouannet has gone so far as to consider Vattel a principal 
founder of modern international law.31 Randall Lessafer places 
Vattel (along with his intellectual muse Christian Wolff) as the 
leading voice on the law of peace treaties in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.32 As pointed out in War Manifestos, Emer 
de Vattel noted that war declarations were “the constant 
practice among the powers of Europe.” 33 He states that: 
In order to be justifiable in taking up arms, it is 
necessary—1. That we have a just cause of complaint. 2. 
That a reasonable satisfaction have been denied us. 3. 
The ruler of the nation, as we have observed, ought 
maturely to consider whether it be for the advantage of 
the state to prosecute his right by force of arms. But all 
this is not sufficient. As it is possible that the present 
fear of our arms may make an impression on the mind of 
our adversary, and induce him to do us justice, we owe 
this farther regard to humanity, and especially to the 
lives and peace of the subjects, to declare to the unjust 
nation, or its chief, that we are at length going to have 
recourse to the last remedy, and make use of open force 
for the purpose of bringing him to reason. This is called 
declaring war.34 
Vattel makes clear that the war aims must be made 
publicly. Notice to the state against whom the declaration is 
made is demanded by “natural law” but custom goes further, 
requiring publication domestically and abroad. 
 
 29. Vattel was christened “Emer.” Some authors have mistakenly given 
him a German name, “Emerich.” See Introduction in EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW 
OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE 
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, WITH THREE EARLY 
ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY (Béla 
Kapossy & Richard Whitmore eds., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2008) (1758). 
 30. Id. 
 31. EMMANUELLE JOUANNET, EMER DE VATTEL ET L’ ÉMERGENCE 
DOCTRINALE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL CLASSIQUE (Paris: A Pedone 1998). 
 32. Id. at 358. 
 33. See DE VATTEL, supra note 29, at 328 (discussing the necessity of 
making war declarations of war under international law). See also Hathaway et 
al., supra note 9. 
 34. See DE VATTEL, supra note 29, at 328. 
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It is necessary that the declaration of war be known to the 
state against whom it is made. This is all which the natural law 
of nations requires. Nevertheless, if custom has introduced 
certain formalities in the business, those nations, who, by 
adopting the custom, have given their tacit consent to such 
formalities, are under an obligation of observing them, as long 
as they have not set them aside by a public renunciation (Prelim. 
§26). Formerly the powers of Europe used to send heralds or 
ambassadors to declare war; at present they content themselves 
with publishing the declaration in the capital, in the principal 
towns, or on the frontiers: manifestoes are issued; and through 
the easy and expeditious channels of communication which the 
establishment of posts now affords, the intelligence is soon 
spread on every side.35 
Besides the foregoing reasons, it is necessary for a nation to 
publish the declaration of war for the instruction and direction 
of her own subjects, in order to fix the date of the rights which 
belong to them from the moment of this declaration, and in 
relation to certain effects which the voluntary law of nations 
attributes to a war in form. Without such a public declaration of 
war, it would, in a treaty of peace, be too difficult to determine 
those acts which are to be considered as the effects of war, and 
those that each nation may set down as injuries of which she 
means to demand reparation.36 
This requirement of a public declaration is interesting both 
in its rationale and detail. It was not enough for a sovereign or 
sovereign government to be internally convinced of the legality 
and rightness of using force, but rather it must be, to the degree 
feasible, made known not only to an opposing sovereign but the 
general public of both nations. This was the customary practice 
of states at the time.37 But why? At least in part because the 
state preparing to use force must also be preparing for the treaty 
of peace that would allow the possibility of a sustainable peace 
with the causes of the armed conflict justly resolved. It is worth 
noting that there is an exception to the requirement of such a 
public declaration: “He who is attacked and only wages defensive 
war, needs not to make any hostile declaration,—the state of 
warfare being sufficiently ascertained by the enemy’s 
declaration or open hostilities.” 38 This will be examined further 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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below. 
With respect to jus post bellum, as in many areas, Vattel 
took Wolff’s work and expanded it into a more comprehensive 
treatise on the transition to peace, paying particular attention 
to the law applicable to the formation and results of peace 
treaties. Vattel was profoundly interested in the connection 
between war and peace, not simply treating them as 
unconnected bodies of law. 
Out of four books in Le Droit des Gens, Vattel devotes an 
entire volume to largely to the subject of the transition to peace: 
“Of the Restoration of Peace; and of Embassies.” This ultimate 
book in Le Droit des Gens begins with a definition of peace as the 
natural state of mankind, contra Hobbes.39 Sovereigns were not 
free to take the obligation of cultivating peace lightly, but were 
bound to it by a “double tie”—as an obligation both to the people 
and to foreign nations.40 This restricts the sovereign not only 
from “embarking in a war without necessity,” but also from 
“persevering in it after the necessity has ceased to exist.”41 
Vattel is applying his law “Of the Restoration of Peace” 
functionally, before peace starts and during war, not limited by 
time. Many of the themes sounded by Vattel are, unsurprisingly, 
along the same lines of Wolff. A sovereign “may carry on the 
operations of war till he has attained its lawful end, which is, to 
procure justice and safety”—showing that the object in mind is 
a peace both just and safe (and thus not unsustainable).42 A 
treaty of peace is inevitably a compromise, in which the rules of 
strict and rigid justice are not observed; otherwise it would be 
impossible to ever make peace.43 A peace treaty extinguishes any 
grievance that gave rise to war, and creates a reciprocal 
obligation to preserve perpetual peace (at least with regards to 
that subject).44 Amnesty is implied in all peace treaties, as peace 
should extinguish all subjects of discord.45 The focus for Vattel 
is clearly establishing a just and sustainable peace. 
Randall Lesaffer wrote the best scholarship on Vattel with 
respect to the transition from armed conflict to peace in his 
contributions to two edited volumes (Vattel’s International Law 
 
 39. Id. at 431. 
 40. Id. § 3, at 432. 
 41. Id. § 6, at 433. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. § 18, at 438. 
 44. Id. § 19, at 439. 
 45. Id. § 20, at 439. 
80 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1 
from a XXIst Century Perspective/Le Droit International de 
Vattel vu du XXI e Siècle and The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of International Law).46 I have no wish to be repetitive 
of Lesaffer’s excellent summation, but would like to draw out 
certain highlights.47 
In A Schoolmaster Abolishing Homework? Vattel on 
Peacemaking and Peace Treaties,48 Lesaffer notes that Wolff and 
Vattel both emphasized the need for compromise and a less-
than-maximalist approach to just claims in order to achieve 
peace. 49 Vattel emphasizes from the outset that there is an 
obligation on all nations to cultivate peace.50 Lessafer notes a 
peace treaty must resolve the underlying issues that Vattel 
identifies: disputes that led to war, the termination of the state 
of war, and the organization of and preservation of the peace.51 
III. A NOTE ON LATIN NEOTERISMS AND THE 
STRUCTURE OF THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 
Many lawyers with an introductory familiarity with 
contemporary discourse on the regulation of the use of armed 
force and the waging of armed conflict will be familiar with the 
division between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and assume that 
these terms describe a natural and ancient distinction. This is 
wrong. Robert Kolb tentatively credited Josef Kunz with coining 
the terms jus ad bellum and jus in bellum in their contemporary 
sense in 1934.52 He notes: 
 
 46. For more on peace treaties in general, as well as a comprehensive 
synopsis of the work of Vattel, including Wolff’s impact on Vattel with respect 
to jus post bellum, see, e.g. PEACE TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE AGES TO WORLD WAR ONE 
(Randall Lesaffer, ed., 2004); Randall Lesaffer, The Westphalia Peace Treaties 
and the Development of the Tradition of Great European Peace Settlements Prior 
to 1648, 18 Grotiana 71 (1997). 
 47. For a more comprehensive synopsis of the work of Vattel, including 
Wolff’s impact on Vattel with respect to jus post bellum, see also VATTEL’S 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A XXIST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE (Vincent Chetail & 
Peter Haggenmacher eds., 2011); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2014). 
 48. Randall Lesaffer, A Schoolmaster Abolishing Homework? Vattel on 
Peacemaking and Peace Treaties, in VATTEL’S INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM A 
XXIST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE 353, 359–66 (Vincent Chetail & Peter 
Haggenmacher eds., 2011). 
 49. Id. at 363. 
 50. Id. at 366. 
 51. Id. at 369. 
 52. Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus ad Bellum/Jus in Bellow, 
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The august solemnity of Latin confers on the terms jus ad 
helium and jus in bello the misleading appearance of being 
centuries old. In fact, these expressions were only coined at the 
time of the League of Nations and were rarely used in doctrine 
or practice until after the Second World War, in the late 1940s 
to be precise.53 
Stahn has identified the emergence of the terms in the 
1920s,54 with Guiliano Enriques using the term jus ad bellum in 
1928.55 If one were to argue for a venerable root of the 
distinction, one could look to Christian Wolff, in the 1764 edition 
of his Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, which 
states: 
Since hostilities in war are due to the force by which we 
pursue our right in war, which consists either in 
collecting a debt or imposing a penalty, and therefore all 
our right in war is to be determined thereby, the right to 
destroy the property of an enemy is not to be determined 
otherwise, unless you should wish to assume a thing 
which can be assumed only in contravention of the law of 
nature, that there is absolutely no place left in war for 
justice, which orders us to give each one his right, and 
that right in war disappears in mere licence, to which 
none can be entitled.56 
The italicized text, “right in war” corresponds to the term 
“jus in bello” on page 300 of the original Latin text. On the next 
page of the original text, Wolff asserts: 
The law of nature, which gives us a right to war, gives 
also a right against the property of enemies, as far as 
that is necessary in waging war; for otherwise the former 
right would be useless, if it were not allowable to claim 
 
37 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 553, 561 (1997). 
 53. Id. at 553. 
 54. Carsten Stahn, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s), 23 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2008). 
 55. See Giuliano Enriques, Considerazioni sulla teoria della Guerra nel 
diritto Internazionale [Considerations on the Theory of War in International 
Law], 7 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE [R.D.I.] 172 (1928) (It.). 
 56. 2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA 
PERTRACTATUM, 426 (James Brown Scott ed., Joseph H. Drake & Francis J. 
Hemelt trans., 1934) (emphasis added). 
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the latter.57 
The translated text “right to war” is in the original text: “jus ad 
bellum.”58 
What does this tell us about the contemporary usage of the 
term? Reviewing the terms as they were used does not indicate 
any clear link to the current usage. Nor is there any evidence 
that these terms, as used by Wolff, were identified by subsequent 
scholars. It is unsurprising that those particular words should 
come together in a long book in Latin about international law. 
Kolb and Stahn are right in essence—the reason these terms are 
used today is not because Wolff used them in the eighteenth 
century. They are used, in this author’s view, primarily because 
of the need to protect jus in bello from jus ad bellum, to 
emphasize that the constraints on the waging of war apply 
equally to all belligerents, regardless of the justice or legality of 
the overall recourse to the use of force.59 
Jus post bellum is self-consciously named in relation to its 
sister terms, jus ad bellum and jus in bello—terms that have 
been exhaustively developed and theorized since they were 
coined in the early–1900s. Jus post bellum, in contrast, is 
comparatively under-developed. For jus post bellum, there is no 
foundational treaty text equivalent to the Hague Regulations of 
189960 and 190761 or the Geneva Conventions of 194962 for jus in 
 
 57. Id. at 427 (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. To the author’s knowledge, other scholars have not identified Wolff’s 
early usage of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. That said, this usage is still 
interesting with respect to the question of the normative and historical 
foundations of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and their sister term, jus post bellum. 
In these passages, Wolff seeks to determine the natural law pertaining to the 
right to destroy enemy property and appears to distinguish between justice 
during war and the right to go to war. Id. at 426-427. 
 59. Compare Kolb, supra note 52 (discussing the misleading implication of 
jus ad helium and jus in bello being centuries old), and Stahn, supra note 54, at 
426–27 (discussing the emergence of the terms in the twentieth century), with 
Wolff, supra note 56 (utilizing the terms jus in bello and jus ad bellum in the in 
the mid eighteen century). 
 60. See Hague Convention IV, Declaration III Concerning the Prohibition 
of the Use of Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil 
(ser. 2) 1002 (entered into force Sept. 4, 1900). 
 61. See Hague Convention IV, Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461 (entered into force 
Jan. 26, 1910). 
 62. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 3; Geneva Convention II, supra 
note 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 
3. 
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bello or Articles 2 and 51 of the U.N. Charter63 for jus ad bellum. 
It is a phrase frequently used without definition, or with little 
understanding that others may use the term to mean something 
else. It is almost never used with anything approaching a full 
exposition of the intellectual history upon which it is built. 
Before the scholarship in recent years, the laws and principles 
that constitute the jus post bellum were rarely expounded. 
Revisiting these terms and allowing for their use without 
necessarily cabining one’s analysis to a temporal conception of 
the terms allows for consideration of whether conduct ante 
bellum can have post bellum effects. 
IV. CURRENT DISCUSSION: THE RESTRICTIVE 
CONTRA BELLUM THESIS AND RELAXED 
ANTITHESIS 
Why were war manifestos useful? In War Manifestos, the 
authors identify several reasons. First, it was required by law.64 
Second, it served the practical purpose of providing the 
possibility of avoiding war by settlement of the stated grievances 
informally or in fully-formed peace treaties before armed 
conflict.65 Third, a variety of reputational costs are described, 
from the conscience of the sovereign,66 to popular domestic 
support,67 to support from allies.68 These are all, in essence, jus 
ad bellum concerns, dealing with whether or not it was legal and 
practical to resort to the use of force. This makes sense given the 
current framework by which modern jurists tend to approach 
questions of law and peace, with jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and 
jus post bellum largely cabined off from one another. 
If that is why war manifestos were useful, why is the study 
of them useful today? Again, the focus in War Manifestos is 
focused on jus ad bellum, in addition to domestic law issues. 
Given the horrors of ongoing armed conflict throughout the 
period studied, the principal lesson given by the authors of War 
 
 63. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 51. 
 64. Hathaway et al., supra note 9, at 35. See also DE VATTEL, supra note 
29, §55, at 329. 
 65. See Hathaway et al., supra note 9, at 39–43 (giving the examples of the 
Caroline incident and the Nootka crisis). See also id. at 43–45 (giving the 
example of the Eden Agreement). 
 66. Id. at 45. 
 67. Id. at 48. 
 68. Id. at 50. 
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Manifestos is that the past is a place that is interesting to study, 
but one would not want to live there. In a world where the use of 
force was not restricted to self-defense, U.N. Security Council 
authorization, or permission of the territorial state, but also 
included treaty obligations, tortious wrongs, violations of the 
laws of war, protecting the balance of power, religious claims, 
protection of trade interests, humanitarian protection, 
protection of diplomatic relations, debt collection, and 
declarations of independence,69 war is inevitably more frequent. 
With fewer justifications, there are fewer armed conflicts, 
according to their formulation.70 The authors of War Manifestos 
seem squarely in favor of a restrictive, modern, orthodox jus 
contra bellum.71 
In Prizeless Wars, Blum emphasizes the limited allowable 
function and results of armed conflict after the U.N. Charter: 
The terms of the Charter made it clear that no state could 
lawfully gain land or hold onto colonized territories 
through force. Wars could no longer function as means of 
adjudication or enforcement, be waged for collection of 
debt or the punishment of transgressors, or prosecuted 
with the goal of converting the religion or beliefs of other 
people.72 
This is laudable, but Blum continues: 
What we have lost is the ability to specify the exact goals 
of war, to identify a clear moment of victory when the 
goals of war are satisfied and the war has no further 
justifiable ground upon which to continue. The broad list 
of affirmative goals, resting on a broad list of permissible 
justifications, that warring parties were free to pursue in 
the pre-Charter era was, to modern eyes, wildly 
permissive; but in a sense, it was also restrictive. For 
once set, these asserted goals gave warring parties clear 
yardsticks for the purpose of the war—for what it could 
 
 69. Id. at 52 (listing the causes in the manifesto collection offered by 
sovereigns in order of frequency). 
 70. See generally id. (examining the history and evolution of war 
manifestos). 
 71. See id. at 4, n.1 (“Regardless of the disagreements around the edges, 
however, there is a strong consensus that the right to war—the jus ad bellum—
is tightly constrained.”). 
 72. Blum, supra note 11, at 635. 
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and should attempt to achieve. And this, in turn, 
indicated when the war had to end.73 
Blum’s central thesis is that because the criterion for the use 
of force is generally restricted to self-defense, the current 
articulation of jus ad bellum falls short.74 While contemporary, 
jus contra bellum retains certain requirements of classical just 
war jus ad bellum, including: 
[L]ast resort (through necessity), proportionality, and 
perhaps even legitimate authority (a state government under 
the right circumstances or the Security Council). Some other 
elements of [just war theory] were largely foregone. Right 
intention, for instance, is not an objective requirement of the jus 
ad bellum, and as long as there is a justified self-defensive 
action, the true intention of the defender is not further 
investigated, at least as a formal matter. Similarly, the law does 
not require that a defender faces a reasonable chance of success. 
75 
Blum would widen the discussion of the goals of the use of 
armed force to clarify what is meant by self-defense in practice, 
stating: “Regime change, democratization, nation-building, 
gender equality, even the elimination of each and every member 
of an adversary group have all been cited as defensive goals of 
recent wars.” 76 Blum’s argument seems to press against the 
orthodox jus contra bellum, stating: 
Wars can, in the wake of much suffering, be wise or 
unwise, profitable or wasteful, and bring about good or 
bad outcomes. But none of this matters under the lens of 
international law, where self-defense is the only 
legitimate paradigm through which all use of force must 
be articulated, evaluated, and justified. 77 
Likely the foremost liberal internationalist advocating for a 
change (although sometimes phrased as a clarification) of jus ad 
bellum restrictions on use of force is Harold Hongju Koh.78 In 
 
 73. Id. at 636. 
 74. Id. at 637. 
 75. Id. at 658. 
 76. Id. at 641. 
 77. Id. at 639. 
 78. See e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian 
Intervention, 53 HOUSTON L. REV. 971 (2016). 
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one of his most recent works on the same theme, Humanitarian 
Intervention: Time for Better Law,79 Koh argues for a 
reevaluation of whether unilateral humanitarian intervention is 
always per se illegal under international law80 based on a limited 
selection of state practice. He identifies the current period as a 
lawmaking moment, one in which legitimacy and legality can be 
reconciled in order to allow a response to threatened or ongoing 
atrocities without losing the benefits of a restrictive jus contra 
bellum.81 This is an argument that has again come to the fore 
after the April 6, 2017, missile strikes by the United States 
government against the Syrian government, an argument that 
has replayed almost verbatim from the debate in 2013, when 
airstrikes against the Syrian government by the United States 
were threatened but not carried out.82 One of the more 
illuminating examples of the argument occurred in a four-part 
online debate on the subject between Koh and Carsten Stahn, 
with Stahn defending the orthodox restrictive jus contra bellum 
interpretation of the law.83 
Koh may feel that 2017, like 2013, is a moment of particular 
lawmaking potential. But the stale nature of the debate on jus 
 
 79. Harold Hongju Koh, Humanitarian Intervention: Time for Better Law, 
111 AM. J. OF INT’L. L. UNBOUND, 287–91 (2017). 
 80. Id. Koh also briefly discusses domestic legality of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention pursuant to United States law. Id. 
 81. Id. at 287 (“The time has come for international lawyers to develop a 
better rule to evaluate the legality of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention . . . .”). 
 82. See Vito Todeschini & John Louth, Debate Map: Armed Conflict and 
Use of Force in Syria, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/debate
_map_syria/debate-map-use-of-force-against-syria (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) 
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(last visited Oct. 17, 2016); Carsten Stahn, On Intervention, Narratives of 
Progress, Threats of Force and the Virtue of Case-by-Case Assessment – A 
Rejoinder to Koh (Part III), OPINIO JURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/14/
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Oct. 17, 2016). 
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ad bellum provides reason to believe that there is no clear road 
ahead for the legal reforms which Koh advocates. Indeed, 
questions as to the binding nature of jus ad bellum have been in 
constant and increasing circulation since the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (“NATO”) use of force in Kosovo.84 Nor, 
perhaps, are arguments by Stahn, Hathaway, and Shapiro 
asserting the importance of celebrating and defending existing 
jus contra bellum likely to convince those who see the duty of 
international lawyers to create an ethical world public order.85 
Koh’s emphases—normative values, connecting law and 
policy, and a lawyer’s duty to play a leading and constructive role 
in interpreting law—are no accident.86 They are a direct 
outgrowth of his long and fruitful engagement with the New 
Haven School of International Law. In Koh’s 2007 evaluation of 
the New Haven School, he identifies a number of commitments 
the school has made, including normative values and connecting 
law and policy. 87 He emphasizes that competing schools of 
international law such as those espousing a commitment to a 
“new sovereigntism” hold a depressing vision of international 
lawyers as yes men or scriveners, rather than architects, public 
servants, or simply “lawyers as leaders.”88 In Koh’s 2001 An 
Uncommon Lawyer, he lovingly recalls examples of lawyers as 
“moral actors” who “guide the evolution of legal process with the 
application of fundamental values.” 89 In one of the most cited 
international law articles of all time, Koh’s 1997 Why Do Nations 
Obey International Law, he notes that the New Haven School 
“viewed international law as itself a decisionmaking [sic] process 
dedicated to a set of normative values” in contrast to “a set of 
rules promulgated by a pluralistic community of states, which 
creates the context that cabins a political decisionmaking [sic] 
 
 84. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF 
POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO (1st ed. 2001); Michael J. Glennon, 
The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 539 (2001). 
 85. See generally OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE 
INTERNATIONALIST: HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE 
WORLD (2017) (arguing that attempts to outlaw wars of aggression resulted in 
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 86. This section builds upon the author’s online writings. 
 87. Harold Hongju Koh, Is There a “New” New Haven School of 
International Law? 32 YALE L.J. 559 (2007). 
 88. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Lawyers as Leaders, YALE L.J. POCKET PART 266 
(2007), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/lawyers-as-leaders. 
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process.”90 He also, notably, critiques past failures of the New 
Haven School and notes the critiques of others, demonstrating 
his own intellectual flexibility. In Koh’s 1995 A World 
Transformed, he recalls the 1974 founding of Yale Studies in 
World Public Order (which later became the Yale Journal of 
International Law) and recalls the demand for an evaluation of 
an ethical world public order, refreshed through the decades by 
scholars, including Koh himself.91 
Someone with this perspective will not be satisfied with a 
response that does not allow for the possibility of lawyers to lead 
towards a world order that can prevent atrocity crimes—with 
the U.N. Security Council if possible, nonviolently if possible, but 
without such authorization and with force if necessary. This is 
not necessarily calling for radical change, but rather reflects 
frustration with the likely impossibility of any profound 
structural change under the current U.N. Charter without 
reinterpretation, perhaps echoing Edmund Burke’s maxim—”A 
state without the means of change is without the means of its 
conservation.”92 If international lawyers do not discover a way to 
change the international system to prevent atrocity crimes, it 
threatens the conservation of the international system itself and 
an abdication of duty.93 
In contrast, one may turn again to Hathaway and Shapiro 
in 2013 reminding the reader of the horrors of history94 or the 
simple formulation that regardless of what one wishes the law 
must be, the first duty of the lawyer is to present the law as it is. 
There are countless other sources in defense of the orthodox 
interpretation of U.N. Charter 2.4, but perhaps the most 
revealing source in favor of the existence of an orthodox, 
restrictive jus contra bellum is Koh himself. After all, if the 
current law were sufficient, there would be no need for it to be a 
“time for a better law.” 
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V. MISSING FROM THE DISCUSSION: THE END OF 
WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One issue that could be further developed from the 
arguments expressed in War Manifestos and Prizeless Wars, as 
well as the general debate on how restrictive jus ad bellum/just 
contra bellum is and how restrictive it should be, is the 
connection between the expression of war aims and the 
transition from armed conflict to a just and sustainable peace. 
The research effort that forms the backbone of War Manifestos 
is impressive, and should produce a good amount of additional 
valuable scholarship. One avenue, of course, is further pairing 
the original materials compiled with the publicists of the past, 
as well as an understanding that those publicists were working 
in a conceptual world that did not as clearly demarcate jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum in the manner 
international lawyers do today. To return to Vattel, he declares 
Without such a public declaration of war, it would, in a 
treaty of peace, be too difficult to determine those acts which are 
to be considered as the effects of war, and those that each nation 
may set down as injuries of which she means to demand 
reparation. 95 
Put in modern terms, the state preparing to use force must 
also be preparing for the treaty of peace that would allow the 
possibility of a sustainable peace with the causes of the armed 
conflict justly resolved. In Vattel’s time, it was recognized that 
sovereigns were not free to take the obligation of cultivating 
peace lightly, but were bound to it by a “double tie”—as an 
obligation both to the people and to foreign nations.96 This 
restricts the sovereign not only from “embarking in a war 
without necessity,” but also from “persevering in it after the 
necessity has ceased to exist.”97 A sovereign “may carry on the 
operations of war till he has attained its lawful end, which is, to 
procure justice and safety”98—showing that the object in mind is 
a peace both just and safe and thus sustainable. 
 
 
 95. DE VATTEL, supra note 29, at 329. 
 96. Id. at 432. 
 97. Id. at 433. 
 98. Id. 
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As mentioned before, even in Vattel’s time, there was an 
exception to the requirement of a public formulation and 
declaration of war: “He who is attacked and only wages defensive 
war, needs not to make any hostile declaration,—the state of 
warfare being sufficiently ascertained by the enemy’s 
declaration or open hostilities.”99 One might argue that as the 
only allowable use of force under current law is defensive (unless 
authorized by the U.N. Security Council or the territorial state), 
this limits any requirement to make any public declaration. Of 
course, there is a new obligation to make a certain sort of public 
declaration, derived not from customary international law but 
from the U.N. Charter itself. Article 51 of the Charter says in 
pertinent part: “Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council . . . .”100 Due to the use of “shall,” this is 
obligatory and indicative of whether the state honestly believes 
the use of force is in self-defense.101 
What would contemporary conflicts look like if these historic 
customary obligations to disclose war aims were still recognized 
in a modern form? This necessarily relies on counterfactuals and 
conjectures, but perhaps a cursory look at what can be 
reasonably asserted about what happened and where these fell 
short might be illuminating. In the following sections, a brief 
tour d’horizon will be presented regarding certain uses of force, 
namely Kuwait, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and the 
Ukraine. Volumes have been written on each of these, and only 
a cursory examination will be put forward here. Even this 
cursory examination, however, supports the basic argument that 
the lack of full and honest discourse about the aims of the use of 
force contributed to non-optimal outcomes. In effect, the switch 
from a discourse centered on bellum legale rather than bellum 
justum102 also limits the discourse and frees the potential user 
of force from discussing the full implications of the use of force. 
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As noted by Blum, “Right intention, for instance, is not an 
objective requirement of the jus ad bellum, and as long as there 
is a justified self-defensive action, the true intention of the 
defender is not further investigated, at least as a formal matter. 
Similarly, the law does not require that a defender faces a 
reasonable chance of success.”103 Bringing these historic 
requirements back to the fore particularly when interpretations 
of self-defense are strained would be a beneficial development. 
The implicit assertion made by Blum is that simply 
asserting the aim of “self-defense” tells us an insufficient amount 
about the full scope of the intentions of the entity using force, 
both because of varied potential interpretations of “self-defense” 
as well as the varieties of additional aims that may be part of 
the eventual peace. One may assert that the legal justification 
for the use of force is self-defense and thus the aim is that the 
defense be successful, but that leaves the question of whether 
the aims also include, as Blum states: “[r]egime change, 
democratization, nation-building, gender equality, even the 
elimination of each and every member of an adversary group”104 
unanswered, even though those goals have also informed recent 
uses of force. It is entirely possible for self-defense to be the 
principle legal justification for the use of force but invoking that 
principle is insufficient to properly explain the aims of the entity 
using force, thus depriving all involved of the ability to guide and 
measure resulting conduct and outcomes. 
B. KUWAIT 
The 1990–91 expulsion of Iraqi occupying forces from 
Kuwait was, in many ways, an ideal case of collective self-
defense. Authorized by the U.N. Security Council105 and with the 
cooperation of the government of Kuwait, 106 the goal was plainly 
stated, that: “Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally 
all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 
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 104. Id. at 641. 
 105. S.C. Res. 660 (Aug. 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
 106. See, S.C. Res 678, supra note 105 (“Authorizes Member States co-
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August 1990 . . . .”107 That clear and simple goal likely limited 
the way the armed force was actually used by allied forces acting 
pursuant to U.N. Security Council authorization. Regime change 
in Iraq, democratization or gender equality in Kuwait, nation 
building, elimination of the Iraqi military—none of these goals 
were part of the legal rationale, nor part of the apparent intent 
of the states involved. Given the overwhelming military victory, 
a continued push to change the regime in Iraq might have been 
tempting, but it was largely resisted. A tragic deviation from this 
general picture was the encouragement of rebellion within Iraq, 
resulting in mass atrocities, and paving the way for armed 
conflict to return.108 Nonetheless, on the whole, this close match 
between clear, limited, and stated goals and results supports the 
thesis that clear war aims are helpful in limiting armed conflict 
and creating at least the possibility of a just and sustainable 
peace. For Kuwait and its people, the result was not entry into a 
new millennium of democracy and human rights, but it was the 
return of a sustainable peace.109 Mechanisms for post conflict 
justice, notably the U.N. Compensation Commission, were 
largely successful.110 It would take a new government in the 
United States with new war aims to return Iraq to a state of 
armed conflict. 
C. KOSOVO 
The 1999 NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia 
(“Operation Allied Force”) was the first large-scale military 
action by the organization.111 The objective of the intervention 
was to end Belgrade’s expulsion of ethnic Albanians from 
Kosovo.112 As put by NATO: 
As a result of President Milosevic’s sustained policy of 
ethnic cleansing, hundreds of thousands of Kosovar people are 
seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly in 
Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Others 
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remain in Kosovo, destitute and beyond the reach of 
international relief. These people in Kosovo are struggling to 
survive under conditions of exhaustion, hunger and desperation. 
We will hold President Milosevic and the Belgrade leadership 
responsible for the well-being of all civilians in Kosovo.113 
NATO made five demands upon the President of Yugoslavia, 
namely that he: 
 ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and 
the immediate ending of violence and repression; 
 ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the 
military, police and paramilitary forces; 
 agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an 
international military presence; 
 agree to the unconditional and safe return of all 
refugees and displaced persons and unhindered 
access to them by humanitarian aid 
organisations; 
 provide credible assurance of his willingness to 
work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in 
the establishment of a political framework 
agreement for Kosovo in conformity with 
international law and the Charter of the United 
Nations. 114 
In some respects, this is admirable both in clarity and in 
moral intent. At first blush, this successfully creates a 
connection between the aims of the use of force and the eventual 
results. As self-servingly put by former NATO Secretary General 
Javier Solana: “[c]ontrary to widespread criticism, the air 
campaign achieved every one of its goals. Having seriously 
underestimated allied resolve, Milošević accepted the alliance’s 
demands on June 3 . . . .A humanitarian disaster had been 
averted. About one million refugees could now return in safety. 
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Ethnic cleansing had been reversed.”115 
That said, the stated goals of NATO were notably silent in 
some areas. What guarantees would be provided for the 
ethnically Serb minority in Kosovo? Given the presence of a 
separatist rebellion in Kosovo, what goals or guarantees would 
NATO provide with respect to the potential independence of 
Kosovo or the integrity of the rump Yugoslavia? This failure to 
tackle the central underlying issues for the participants in the 
existing armed conflict was not without implications for the post-
conflict settlement. Given that even enthusiasts for NATO’s 
mission recognized the extreme uncertainty in its legal basis,116 
the failure to provide any clarity as to whether there was any 
goal with respect to Kosovo’s potential status as an independent 
state not only had implications for positive peace within Kosovo 
and between Kosovo and Serbia. Additionally, this likely 
provided a basis for Russia to feel that its allies were under 
threat from what Russia perceived as NATO’s unspoken, hidden 
intentions—with implications for Russia’s use of the veto in the 
U.N. Security Council as well as other conduct in the future. 
D. AFGHANISTAN 
The NATO invasion of Afghanistan following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, was justified on the basis of 
collective self-defense.117 The United States characterized the 
acts of terrorism as an armed attack and effectively attributed 
them to Afghanistan.118 NATO likewise regarded the attacks as 
covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, invoking 
collective self-defense.119 The U.N. Security Council recognized 
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the gravity of the situation, but the goals identified were notably 
less clear than previously with the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.120 
The Security Council called on all states to “bring to justice the 
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks” 
and stressed that “those responsible for aiding, supporting or 
harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these 
acts will be held accountable . . . .”121 The war aims of NATO, the 
plans for a just and sustainable peace that might be the result 
of this action entered into with the legal justification of self-
defense, were unclear. There was no clear public commitment at 
the outset to nation building, human rights, gender equity, or 
any of the numerous justifications for the ongoing armed conflict 
in Afghanistan that trouble the new regime and its allies to this 
day. Perhaps if such aims were stated, sufficient resources could 
have been invested, the armed conflict could have been fought 
with fewer short-term compromises by compromised domestic 
actors, and pressure could have been brought to bear on other 
states such as Pakistan to cease supporting local insurgencies. 
If the goal was a single-minded effort to “bring to justice the 
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks” 
and hold accountable “those responsible for aiding, supporting 
or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors” 122 of 
the attacks on September 11, 2001, maybe the initial effort to 
find high-level Al Qaeda leadership would have been more 
successful. Perhaps not. The notorious human rights abuses123 
were certainly avoidable, and perhaps would have been avoided 
had the plan for peace resulting from stated goals for the use of 
force included a robust human rights agenda. But the failure to 
establish a just and sustainable peace in Afghanistan following 
the invasion at least on a basic level supports the argument that 
the lack of clarity as to the honestly declared aims of the United 
States was not helpful in establishing a just and sustainable 
peace in Afghanistan. 
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E. IRAQ 
The 2003 United States-led invasion and occupation of Iraq 
is, in many ways, the mirror image of the multinational effort to 
expel the Iraqi army from occupied Kuwait. Whereas in Kuwait, 
the effort could be legally justified as an act of collective self-
defense, through U.N. Security Council authorization and for 
good measure, at least for conduct in Kuwait, authorization of 
the territorial state, the 2003 Iraq invasion could not be 
legitimately justified by any of these rationales.124 While in 
Kuwait the public goal was clearly stated and appears to have 
actually been closely related to the intent of the states using 
force, the 2003 Iraq invasion shifted from (before the invasion) 
some combination of alleged violation of U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, alleged association with terrorist groups, and 
alleged development of varied unconventional weapons to (after 
the invasion) democratization, regional stabilization, and 
human rights.125 While in Kuwait, the factual basis for the legal 
justification was unquestionable (the presence of the Iraqi 
military in Kuwait), the 2003 invasion turned out to be based 
out on false assertions.126 While the goal of expelling the Iraqi 
military from Kuwait was accomplished, some of the goals for 
the invasion in 2003 could not be accomplished because they 
were not based in reality (ending unconventional weapons 
programs, ties with terrorists) while others (regional 
stabilization and human rights) have thus far been abject 
failures. From a disastrous civil war and resultant ethnic 
cleansing127 to the Abu Ghraib scandal128 to the ongoing armed 
conflict with Daesh,129 as well as the potential of armed conflict 
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between the central government and the Kurdish minority,130 
the invasion did not create a just and sustainable peace 
compared with the status quo ante.131 
Contrast Vattel’s analysis of what the law requires in these 
two instances. Why did the allied nations decide not to 
overthrow the Iraqi government in the first instance? The 
sovereign allies were not free to take the obligation of cultivating 
peace lightly, but were bound to it by a “double tie”—as an 
obligation both to the people and to foreign nations.132 This 
restricts the sovereign not only from “embarking in a war 
without necessity,” but also from “persevering in it after the 
necessity has ceased to exist.”133 A sovereign “may carry on the 
operations of war till he has attained its lawful end, which is, to 
procure justice and safety”134—showing that the object in mind 
is a peace both just and safe and thus sustainable. In contrast, 
the 2003 invasion failed to provide any sort of realistic 
assessment of what the use of force could cost the people of the 
countries invading, the people of Iraq, and (in time) the people 
of Syria. Nor was there an honest discussion of what the 
diversion of resources from Afghanistan would mean for the war 
aims there. There was insufficient planning and resourcing to 
actually procure justice and safety. The invasion is often 
characterized as violating jus contra bellum, but the disastrous 
occupation and post-occupation in fact, also prompted a strong 
urge to develop what is now called jus post bellum. Vattel’s 
approach would not limit the errors of the invasion to discrete 
violations of lacking a legal basis for the use of force, but place 
the scope of errors both earlier and later. The problems post 
bellum did not start when major combat operations ended, but 
rather were rooted in the failure to have an honest discussion of 
war aims before the invasion began. It also was a devastating  
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blow to the reputation of the United States,135 as well as the idea 
of humanitarian intervention. 
F. LIBYA 
The 2011 NATO-led bombing campaign in Libya in some 
ways resembles the NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia but 
with a limited U.N. Security Council mandate. Here, the only 
legal bases for the use of force are the relevant U.N. Security 
Council resolutions, particularly resolution 1973. U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1973136 listed as an aim to “ensure the 
protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid 
and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the 
safety of humanitarian personnel . . . .”137 and authorized states 
“to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign 
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory . . . .”138 This is a more complex goal than expelling the 
Iraqi military from Kuwait, but still a clearer stated aim than in 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq. It is probably closest to the goal in 
Kosovo. The difficulty in Libya, in contrast with Kuwait, is that 
the intent revealed by the conduct of the foreign states using 
force in Libya is somewhat different than the stated goal of the 
U.N. Security Council.139 Rather, the goal of the foreign states 
seems to have been regime change pursued by means of 
providing air support for a rebellious force. No particular plans 
seem to have been in place or implemented to successfully 
facilitate a just and sustainable peace post-regime change. 
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Having failed to honestly describe and publicly prepare for a 
clear vision of a just and sustainable peace, or to limit the use of 
force to the stated ends authorized by the relevant authority (in 
this case the U.N. Security Council), the post-bellum situation 
in Libya has widely been described as disastrous.140 It has also 
reinforced the view in Russia, and elsewhere, that authorization 
by the U.N. Security Council for limited humanitarian 
intervention is likely to be abused in a dishonest fashion.141 
G. UKRAINE 
Since 2014, Russia has seized control of Ukrainian territory 
(Crimea) and supported separatist armed forces in other areas 
of Ukraine (Donbass).142 There was no claim of self-defense or 
U.N. Security Council authorization for Russian conduct.143 
Russia’s legal justification instead appears to rely on 
authorization by former government officials, primarily former 
President Viktor Yanukovych, the instant recognition of a 
Crimea as an independent state, and then immediate ending of 
the independence of that state through its purported willing 
annexation by Russia.144 This justification lacks merit. Ousted 
government officials cannot agree to the dismemberment of the 
states they no longer represent. What is particularly striking for 
the purposes of this work is not only the flagrancy of the 
violation of a jus cogens norm in the form of the first attempted 
annexation in Europe since the days of the Molotov–Ribbentrop 
Pact, but also the open dishonesty surrounding Russia’s conduct. 
While the Russian government at first officially denied seizing 
Crimean infrastructure after Yanukovych was deposed but 
before “independence,” the government later bragged that this 
was done by Russian special forces and created a holiday in their 
honor.145 Misinformation appears to be a core part of the 
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intentional strategy of Russia.146 
In some respects, Ukraine falls outside the main focus of 
this work, or could be argued to be the exception that proves the 
rule. The argument that “improving the discussion of war aims 
could aid in the successful transition from armed conflict to a 
just and sustainable peace when armed conflict does occur” is 
mainly intended as an analysis for open societies where public 
support is likely to be necessary for the sustained commitment 
of resources if war aims extend beyond symbolic action and the 
public and forthright publication of the actual rationale for and 
goals of the use of force. Most observers would concur that 
Russia is not an open society147 and thus does not necessarily 
need public support for low-cost commitments, and it is unclear 
there is any political cost in Russia for conduct violating 
international law in any case. 
While it is too early to assess the sustainability of the peace 
between Russia, Ukraine, and Russian backed forces, the 
prospects are not promising. The grievance of an ongoing 
violation of Ukrainian sovereignty looks long-term and 
irreconcilable, and the irredentist impulse in the Donbas region 
has not been resolved. More fundamentally, the open flouting of 
the core norm of the international system in the form of 
annexation cannot help but undermine other efforts to restrain 
the use of force. 
H. CONCLUSION: RESTRICTING WAR AND REDUCING 
RECURRENCE 
This work clearly is more focused on the limited set of 
international armed conflicts, particularly those involving the 
United States and Russian militaries since the end of the Cold 
War. The hope in this chapter was to take a reasonable set of 
prominent and relatively recent examples to test the connection 
between an articulation of actual war aims and improving the 
transition from armed conflict to peace. Even given that limited 
set, it is far from exhaustive. The ongoing interconnected set of 
armed conflict in the territory of Syria merits further discussion 
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but is largely set aside in part due to its immense complexity and 
unfinished nature. Non-international armed conflicts do not 
formally fit within the domain of jus ad bellum/jus contra 
bellum, but of course clearly and publicly enunciating the goals 
that would create in the eyes of the armed forces in such conflicts 
is likely to facilitate the eventual successful resolution of the 
conflict, and is in essence part of the lex pacificatoria identified 
by Christine Bell.148 
The authors of War Manifestos hold up the era of varied 
justifications for war as a warning. Blum examines this period 
with more nostalgia, as an era of honestly expressed war aims. 
As is perhaps evident at this point, I think the authors of War 
Manifestos have a stronger point, but Blum’s contribution is also 
valuable. The authors of War Manifestos warn that the legal 
regime whereby the legal justifications for the use of force are 
highly restricted is not natural or inherent, but rather a modern 
creation that was constructed and could be lost.149 Blum warns 
that there is a disconnect between the actual aims behind the 
use of force and the justifications expressed with the limited and 
somewhat sterile terminology of self-defense.150 This work has 
argued largely in favor of keeping rigorous restraints on the use 
of force and the waging of war, but also argues that the goal of a 
just and sustainable peace must be firmly fixed when the first 
evaluations of potential use of force are made.151 Going beyond 
enunciating a basic legal rationale for the use of force and 
requiring those who would use force to explain the particular 
plan of how the armed conflict would produce a specific set of 
desiderata not only may restrain the use of force from being used 
at all, but may alter how it is used and what additional policies 
are employed during and after the use of force. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF 
JUS PACIS AC BELLI AND THE RETURN OF 
THE RES 
In 1943, Georg Schwarzenberger’s Jus Pacis Ac Belli noted 
that the law regarding law and peace was at that moment 
changing and uncertain.152 It was time for better law. War and 
peace no longer existed as wholly separate legal regimes but 
could also have ambiguous periods of status mixtus153 and the 
fundamental shift from justification from war to preservation of 
peace (thus reversing Grotius’ formulation of belli ac pacis154 to 
pacis ac belli). Koh and others have also suggested that we are 
in (or should be in) a time of legal change, but in somewhat the 
reverse direction, with the preservation of peace and the 
restrictions on the use of force needing an exception in certain 
humanitarian situations.155 
If Koh is correct, that it is “Time for Better Law,” it is 
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unclear after review of recent armed conflicts that the moment 
is right for the law to be developed in the manner he suggests. 
Trust between major military powers is perhaps lower than at 
any time since the Cold War. Instead of a wholesale and 
immediate adoption of a standard that would permit the use of 
force in the form of humanitarian intervention without the legal 
justification of U.N. Security Council authorization, self-defense, 
or permission of the territorial state; perhaps first it is time to 
revivify obligations with respect to the open and public 
declaration as to war aims. At a minimum, embracing a 
discourse ethics156 that emphasizes honesty in the face of 
sustained efforts to justify the use of force with misinformation 
by major military powers seems appropriate. 
Even in Vattel’s time, genuine cases of purely and 
unequivocally defensive war did not require any public 
declaration for response: “He who is attacked and only wages 
defensive war, needs not to make any hostile declaration,—the 
state of warfare being sufficiently ascertained by the enemy’s 
declaration or open hostilities.”157 He continues, “In modern 
times, however, the sovereign who is attacked, seldom omits to 
declare war in his turn, whether from an idea of dignity, or for 
the direction of his subjects.”158 Under current law, “Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council . . . .”159 
This obligation to report to the Security Council, in combination 
with the customary international law obligation to declare to the 
“unjust nation” the use of force,160 should encourage in 
particular with respect to questionable or creative legal 
justifications for the use of force an obligation for a full and 
forthright disclosure of the aims of the use of force. 
Embracing this obligation would be helpful in a number of 
respects. It might in some instances avoid the use of force 
altogether, as described by War Manifestos161 through the 
facilitation of an agreement between states or reconsideration 
due to public pressure against the state considering use of force. 
This arguably occurred with respect to threatened use of force 
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against Syria during the Obama administration. It may limit the 
use of force even if the use of force is not avoided. This arguably 
happed during the expulsion of the Iraqi military from Kuwait. 
Finally, it may improve the odds of creating a just and 
sustainable peace in the aftermath of the use of force. This also 
arguably occurred after the expulsion of the Iraqi military from 
Kuwait. For the state wishing to justify a colorable but 
questionable justification of self-defense, declaration to the U.N. 
Security Council may be helpful or necessary to indicate whether 
the state honestly believes the use of force is self-defense,162 and 
indeed may be helpful legally in terms of any retroactive legal 
cover the U.N. Security Council may provide. 
More fundamentally, a renewed emphasis on an honest 
formulation and disclosure may help restore the trust needed for 
any more radical proposal such as Koh’s to be consented to by 
states, particularly Russia and China. It would also help restore 
the damaged reputation of humanitarian intervention after its 
misuse as a post-hoc attempted justification for the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, its misuse to justify regime change in Libya, and 
its misuse by Russia in the Ukraine. The honest articulation of 
the aims of the use of force has legal, normative, and practical 
implications. Particularly before any questionable use of force 
occurs, it should be obligatory. 
There is a risk of emphasizing the need for an honest 
discussion of war aims, namely that such discussion is taken as 
a license rather than an additional restriction. It may be an 
environment where powerful states and certain jurists are eager 
to reinterpret a restrictive jus contra bellum and demand a 
rigorous and conservative defense of an orthodox interpretation. 
But the risk of thinking anew about revivifying old obligations 
to articulate war aims is a risk worth taking. There is much to 
gain, as described above. If the current trend of increased 
mendacity and disregard for the truth continues (exhibited most 
powerfully in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the ongoing 
occupation of Ukraine), the results may be catastrophic. 
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At the time of this writing, there is a substantial possibility 
of an armed conflict between the United States and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), as well as 
various potential co-belligerents. The United States has declared 
“if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice 
but to totally destroy North Korea.”163 It is unclear what the 
United States government means by being “forced to defend.” 
Nor is there a clear, public explanation of how the aim of totally 
destroying North Korea will lead to a just and sustainable peace. 
Even more than after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there is no 
apparent plan for the hundreds of thousands of casualties such 
an armed conflict would likely produce. There has perhaps never 
been such a pressing need for a clear explanation from both sides 
as to the aims guiding their threatened use of force. 
In the Middle Ages, the “Res” or “thing” was the territory, 
property, or other object over which the just war was fought, and 
was intimately connected to the idea of causa or justa causa 
which was the characterization of the res; that is, that it was just 
to pursue the res in war, for example, to lawfully recover 
territory.164 Under current law governing international armed 
conflicts, the prohibition of annexation as the res or indeed any 
“use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations”165 means that the 
description of a particular res is generally not clearly articulated. 
The res reimagined for current uses of force might not always be 
a physical thing or territory, but a clear explanation of the 
outcomes intended by the use of force. The res in Kuwait was 
mainly the territory of Kuwait, the justa causa mainly to 
lawfully recover territory, and to the extent that goal guided the 
use of force, the use of force was not only legally permissible but 
served the goal of creating a just and sustainable peace. With 
Kosovo, the res was not a physical thing but the protection of 
Kosovars—but as with Libya there was no clearly articulated 
vision of how that could be achieved in the long-term and how 
that would interact with Yugoslav and Libyan sovereignty. 
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While annexation and interference with the territorial integrity 
and political independence remains prohibited, there is a need 
for a clear articulation of the res in each instance, particularly if 
states are tempted to stretch a conservative interpretation of 
self-defense as the legal justification for the use of force. 
It is time for a return of the res. Before force is used, there 
should be a full explanation of why it must be used. This goes 
beyond legal justification to a comprehensive articulation of the 
goals behind the use of force and a plan to achieve them. Before 
the mortar is fired, it should be made clear why the bridge must 
be destroyed, and how it will, one day, be rebuilt. 
 
